What Entity Decides How We Adjust to Environmental Shifts?
For many years, “stopping climate change” has been the central objective of climate policy. Throughout the political spectrum, from grassroots climate advocates to elite UN negotiators, reducing carbon emissions to prevent future disaster has been the central focus of climate policies.
Yet climate change has come and its tangible effects are already being felt. This means that climate politics can no longer focus solely on preventing future catastrophes. It must now also encompass struggles over how society addresses climate impacts already reshaping economic and social life. Coverage systems, property, aquatic and territorial policies, national labor markets, and regional commerce – all will need to be fundamentally transformed as we adapt to a changed and more unpredictable climate.
Ecological vs. Societal Impacts
To date, climate response has focused on the environmental impacts of climate change: strengthening seawalls against ocean encroachment, upgrading flood control systems, and retrofitting buildings for severe climate incidents. But this structural framing ignores questions about the institutions that will influence how people experience the political impacts of climate change. Do we enable property insurance markets to operate freely, or should the federal government guarantee high-risk regions? Is it right to uphold disaster aid systems that solely assist property owners, or do we ensure equitable recovery support? Should we abandon workers working in extreme heat to their management's decisions, or do we establish federal protections?
These questions are not theoretical. In the United States alone, a surge in non-renewal rates across the homeowners’ insurance industry – even beyond high-risk markets in Florida and California – indicates that climate risks to trigger a countrywide coverage emergency. In 2023, UPS workers proposed a nationwide strike over on-the-job heat exposure, ultimately achieving an agreement to fit air conditioning in delivery trucks. That same year, after decades of drought left the Colorado River’s reservoirs at unprecedented levels – threatening water supplies for 40 million people – the Biden administration compensated Arizona, Nevada and California $1.2bn to cut their water usage. How we react to these governmental emergencies – and those to come – will embed radically distinct visions of society. Yet these struggles remain largely outside the purview of climate politics, which continues to treat adaptation as a specialist concern for specialists and technicians rather than real ideological struggle.
Transitioning From Specialist Models
Climate politics has already evolved past technocratic frameworks when it comes to carbon cutting. Nearly 30 years ago, the Kyoto protocol symbolized the prevailing wisdom that commercial systems would solve climate change. But as emissions kept growing and those markets proved unsuccessful, the focus moved to national-level industrial policy debates – and with it, climate became truly ideological. Recent years have seen any number of political battles, including the green capitalism of Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act versus the democratic socialism of the Green New Deal to debates over lithium nationalization in Bolivia and mining industry support in Germany. These are conflicts about principles and negotiating between opposing agendas, not merely carbon accounting.
Yet even as climate migrated from the preserve of technocratic elites to more familiar domains of political struggle, it remained limited to the realm of decarbonization. Even the ideologically forward agenda of Zohran Mamdani’s NYC mayoral campaign – which links climate to the cost-of-living crisis, arguing that lease stabilization, comprehensive family support and free public transit will prevent New Yorkers from relocating for more economical, but resource-heavy, life in the suburbs – makes its case through an carbon cutting perspective. A fully inclusive climate politics would apply this same societal vision to adaptation – reforming social institutions not only to prevent future warming, but also to handle the climate impacts already changing everyday life.
Transcending Doomsday Narratives
The need for this shift becomes more evident once we reject the apocalyptic framing that has long dominated climate discourse. In insisting that climate change constitutes an unstoppable phenomenon that will entirely destroy human civilization, climate politics has become blind to the reality that, for most people, climate change will appear not as something totally unprecedented, but as familiar problems made worse: more people excluded of housing markets after disasters, more workers compelled to work during heatwaves, more local industries devastated after extreme weather events. Climate adaptation is not a distinct technical challenge, then, but rather connected to existing societal conflicts.
Developing Governmental Battles
The terrain of this struggle is beginning to emerge. One influential think tank, for example, recently recommended reforms to the property insurance market to make vulnerable homeowners to the “full actuarial cost” of living in high-risk areas like California. By contrast, a progressive research institute has proposed a system of Housing Resilience Agencies that would provide comprehensive public disaster insurance. The difference is stark: one approach uses economic incentives to encourage people out of vulnerable areas – effectively a form of organized relocation through market pressure – while the other commits public resources that allow them to remain safely. But these kinds of policy debates remain infrequent in climate discourse.
This is not to suggest that mitigation should be discarded. But the exclusive focus on preventing climate catastrophe masks a more current situation: climate change is already reshaping our world. The question is not whether we will restructure our institutions to manage climate impacts, but how – and which perspective will triumph.